<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2393-6193</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista de Derecho (Universidad Católica Dámaso A. Larrañaga, Facultad de Derecho)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Rev. Derecho]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2393-6193</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Facultad de Derecho - Universidad Católica del Uruguay.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2393-61932019000100181</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22235/rd.v0i19.1731</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[La mirada interpretativa como base de una discrecionalidad discreta]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The interpretative view as the basis of a discreet thesis about judicial discretion]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[O olhar interpretativo como base de discrição discreta]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gamarra]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Diego]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Católica del Uruguay  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Uruguay</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>19</numero>
<fpage>181</fpage>
<lpage>193</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2393-61932019000100181&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2393-61932019000100181&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2393-61932019000100181&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: En la senda trazada por Dworkin, se propone una concepción sobre la discrecionalidad jurisdiccional -discreta- a partir de la asunción de una necesaria posición interpretativa. A esos efectos se parte de la tesis de la indeterminación parcial del lenguaje y en particular de las reglas -conforme la formulación de Hart de tal posición-, que en términos de aplicación del derecho, independientemente de la perspectiva, determina el reconocimiento de la posibilidad de distinguir, al menos en ocasiones, casos fáciles y difíciles. Se presenta, asimismo, una posición externa o interna sobre la discrecionalidad y una tesis fuerte y una débil sobre su configuración. Se sostendrá que desde una insoslayable mirada interpretativa -interna-, que supone además vocación de coherencia sostenible en la tarea, la discrecionalidad no lo es en un sentido fuerte sino excepcionalmente, pues supone argumentar sobre una solución excluyente de otras con fundamento en los materiales jurídicos que componen el sistema]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: On the grounds of Dworkin contributions, considering the inevitability of an interpretative perspective, a discreet conception of judicial discretion is proposed. It is herein accepted the thesis of the relative indeterminacy of language and, specifically, of rules -in the terms suggested by Hart- that, regarding adjudication of Law and with independence of the point of view, determines that the distinction among hard and soft cases is in general possible. Likewise, it is presented a strong and a weak thesis about discretion, taking also into account the internal and external perspective for such purposes. Finally, it will be defended that from an interpretative perspective, which is not possible to avoid and that supposes a task to be executed with vocation of coherency and stability, the discretion is only exceptionally strong, as interpretation of legal texts is carried out arguing about an excluding solution to be adopted and based on the recognized materials of the legal system]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[Resumo: No caminho desenhado por Dworkin, propõe uma concepção sobre a discrição jurisdicional-discreta-a partir do pressuposto de uma posição interpretativa necessária. A estes efeitos faz parte da tese da indeterminação parcial da língua e, em particular, das regras-de acordo com a formulação de Hart de tal posição, que em termos de aplicação da lei, independentemente da perspectiva, determina o reconhecimento da possibilidade de distinguir, pelo menos às vezes, casos fáceis e difíceis. Ele também apresenta uma posição externa ou interna sobre a discrição e uma tese forte e fraca sobre sua configuração. Argumentará que a partir de um olhar inevitável interpretativo-interno, que também implica uma vocação para a coerência sustentável na tarefa, a discrição não é em um sentido forte, mas excepcionalmente, porque implica discutir sobre uma solução exclusiva de outros baseados nos materiais jurídicos que compõem o sistema]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[interpretación jurídica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[discrecionalidad de los jueces]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[interpretation of legal texts]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[judicial discretion]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[interpretación legal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[discrição dos juízes]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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