<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2393-6193</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista de Derecho (Universidad Católica Dámaso A. Larrañaga, Facultad de Derecho)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Rev. Derecho]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2393-6193</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Facultad de Derecho - Universidad Católica del Uruguay.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2393-61932019000100049</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22235/rd.v0i19.1733</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Argumentos positivistas en la era postpositivista]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Positivist arguments in the Post-positivist Age]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[Argumentos positivistas na era Postpositivista]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Marquisio]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Ricardo]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de la República  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Uruguay</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>19</numero>
<fpage>49</fpage>
<lpage>75</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2393-61932019000100049&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2393-61932019000100049&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2393-61932019000100049&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: Denomino era postpositivista al estado de la teoría jurídica posterior al &#8220;debate Hart-Dworkin&#8221; en el cual el positivismo ha perdido la ambición que lo caracterizara a lo largo de la historia y que lo hacía distintivo en su confrontación con el iusnaturalismo: dar cuenta de una normatividad específicamente jurídica, compatible con el escepticismo o la postura evitativa acerca de la existencia de una moral objetiva. En la era postpositivista, asociada a un proceso de constitucionalización que abarca a la propia filosofía del derecho, conviven múltiples propuestas orientadas a dar cuenta de la normatividad jurídica y compatibles con la tesis social, que hoy es el mínimo común en el que convergen los positivismos contemporáneos. El objeto de este trabajo es: (I) identificar algunos requisitos que, en el marco de los desafíos del constitucionalismo, deberían cumplir los argumentos positivistas; (II) presentar algunos énfasis positivistas, basados en la relevancia moral de la distinción &#8220;ser/deber ser&#8221; del derecho: antiformalismo, auto-restricción de los intérpretes e intencionalidad de la interpretación, contingencia del mundo social.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: I call Post-positivist Age the status of legal theory after the "Hart-Dworkin debate" in which positivism has lost the ambition that characterized it throughout history and that made it distinctive in its confrontation with Natural Law Theory: to give account of a specifically legal normativity, compatible with the skepticism or the avoidant position about the existence of an objective morality. In the Post-positivist Age, associated with a growing constitutionalization process that encompasses the philosophy of law itself, there are multiple proposals aimed at giving account of legal regulations and compatible with the social thesis, which currently is the common minimum in which the contemporary positivisms converge. The purpose of this paper is: (I) to identify some requirements that, within the framework of the challenges of constitutionalism, the positivist arguments should fulfill; (II) present some positivist emphases, based on the moral relevance of the distinction "to be / should be" of the law: anti-formalism, self-restriction of interpreters and intentionality of interpretation, contingency of the social world.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[Resumo: Eu chamo de era pós-positivista o status da teoria jurídica após o "debate de Hart-Dworkin", no qual o positivismo perdeu a ambição que o caracterizou ao longo da história e que o distinguiu em seu confronto com a lei natural: consideração de uma normatividade especificamente legal, compatível com o ceticismo ou com a posição de evitar a existência de uma moralidade objetiva. Na era pós-positivista, associada a um crescente processo de constitucionalização que engloba a própia filosofia do direito, existem múltiplas propostas voltadas para a contabilização de normas legais e compatíveis com a tese social, que hoje é o mínimo comum em que os positivismos contemporâneos. O objetivo deste trabalho é: (I) identificar alguns requisitos que, no quadro dos desafios do constitucionalismo, os argumentos positivistas devem cumprir; (II) apresentar algumas ênfases positivistas, baseadas na relevância moral da distinção "ser / dever ser" do direito: antiformalismo, autolimitação dos intérpretes e intencionalidade da interpretação, contingência do mundo social.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[positivismo jurídico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[postpositivismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[iusnaturalismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[normatividad jurídica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[legal positivism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[postpositivism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[law natural theory]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[legal normativity]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[positivismo jurídico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[pos-positivismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[iusnaturalismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[normatividade jurídica]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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