<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2301-0665</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista de la Facultad de Derecho]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Rev. Fac. Der.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2301-0665</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Facultad de Derecho. Universidad de la República.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2301-06652024000201203</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22187/rfd2024n58a1</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Moral, Derecho y Ética Judicial]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Morality, Law and Judicial Ethics]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[Moral, Direito e Ética Judicial]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Marquisio Aguirre]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Ricardo]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,UDELAR FDER ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Uruguay</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2024</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2024</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>58</numero>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2301-06652024000201203&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2301-06652024000201203&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2301-06652024000201203&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen En este artículo se aborda el fundamento de la ética judicial indagando el papel normativo que sus estándares desempeñan en un modelo de razonamiento práctico que integra a la moral y al derecho. A partir de la constatación de un amplio consenso en la práctica jurídica, en cuanto a que hay exigencias morales que se aplican de manera específica a los jueces, se consideran algunas posibles soluciones al problema de sus fundamentos: ¿son un mero recurso retórico? ¿constituyen una moral especial? ¿suponen la derivación, desde la ética normativa, de un único principio moral general de valoración de las acciones? La conclusión es que ninguna de esas respuestas es satisfactoria. Los estándares de la ética judicial tienen su fundamento directo en el rol que asumen los jueces, a partir de un compromiso institucional con la práctica jurídica, que origina una obligación moral fundamental: aplicar el derecho creado por la legislatura.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract This paper addresses the foundations of judicial ethics by investigating the normative role that its standards play in a model of practical reasoning that integrates morality and law. Based on the observation of a broad consensus in legal practice, as to the fact that there are moral requirements that apply specifically to judges, some possible solutions to the problem of their foundations are considered: are they a mere rhetorical resource? Do they constitute a special morality? Do they suppose the derivation, from normative ethics, of a single general moral principle of evaluation of actions? The conclusion is that none of these answers is satisfactory. The standards of judicial ethics are directly based on the role assumed by judges, based on an institutional commitment to legal practice, which gives rise to a fundamental moral obligation: to apply the law created by the legislature.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[Resumo Este artigo aborda os fundamentos da ética judicial, investigando o papel normativo que suas padres desempenham em um modelo de raciocínio prático que integra moralidade e direito. A partir da confirmação de um amplo consenso na prática jurídica, de que existem requisitos morais que se aplicam especificamente aos juízes, consideram-se algumas possíveis soluções para o problema dos seus fundamentos: serão eles um mero recurso retórico? Eles constituem uma moralidade especial? Supõem eles a derivação, da ética normativa, de um único princípio moral geral de valoração das ações? O resultado final é que nenhuma dessas respostas é satisfatória. Os padrões de ética judicial têm a sua base direta no papel assumido pelos juízes, baseado num compromisso institucional com a prática jurídica, o que dá origem a uma obrigação moral fundamental: aplicar a lei criada pelo legislador.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Ética Judicial]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Moral y Derecho]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Normatividad Jurídica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Estado de Derecho]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Judicial Ethics]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Morality and Law]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Legal Normativity]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Rule of Law]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Ética Judicial]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Moral e Direito]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Normatividade Juridica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[Estado de Direito]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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