<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2301-0665</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista de la Facultad de Derecho]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Rev. Fac. Der.]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2301-0665</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Facultad de Derecho. Universidad de la República.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2301-06652017000200053</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22187/rfd2017n2a4</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[El ideal de autonomía moral]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The Ideal of Moral Autonomy]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="pt"><![CDATA[O ideal de autonomia moral]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Marquisio Aguirre]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Ricardo]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de la República Facultad de Derecho ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Uruguay</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2017</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>43</numero>
<fpage>53</fpage>
<lpage>95</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2301-06652017000200053&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2301-06652017000200053&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2301-06652017000200053&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: En este ensayo planteo algunos elementos constitutivos del ideal de autonomía moral, que resulta un presupuesto central de las prácticas sociales centradas en la imputación normativa, fundamentalmente la moral y el derecho. Parto de una concepción constructivista de la normatividad, tomando como elemento esencial y no reductible a las razones, y me centro en los rasgos conceptuales que caracterizan a las razones morales dentro del dominio normativo. Posteriormente, desarrollo una idea de la autonomía moral basada en la auto-constitución que incluye tres propiedades fundamentales: la posibilidad de responder a razones fundadas en expectativas sociales compartidas; la responsabilidad por cierto ámbito de acciones, según el conjunto de razones de que dispone el sujeto y hasta el punto en que pueda ampliarlas, y la necesidad de conservar la autonomía como finalidad que unifica el conjunto de acciones autónomas de los agentes morales.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: Some elements of the ideal of moral autonomy are discussed in this paper. Such ideal is a key assumption in social practices focused on normative imputation, particularly morality and law. First, a constructivist conception of normativity is introduced, taking reasons as an essential and non-reducible element, and focused on the conceptual features of moral reasons within the normative domain. Then, an idea of moral autonomy based on the self-constitution is developed including three key features: the possibility of responding to reasons based on shared social expectations; the responsibility for certain scope of actions, according to a set of reasons available to the individual and to their maximum extent of expansion; and the need to preserve autonomy as a purpose unifying the set of autonomous actions of moral agents.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="pt"><p><![CDATA[Resumo: Neste ensaio apresento alguns elementos constitutivos do ideal de autonomia moral, que é um pressuposto central das práticas sociais com foco na imputação normativa, fundamentalmente na moral e no direito. Partindo de uma conceição construtivista da normatividade, tomo como elemento essencial e não redutível às razões, e focalizo-me nos aspectos conceituais que caracterizam as razões morais dentro do domínio normativo. Posteriormente, desenvolvo uma idéia da autonomia moral baseada na auto-constituição que inclui três propriedades fundamentais: a possibilidade de responder a razões fundadas em expectativas sociais compartilhadas; a responsabilidade por determinado âmbito de ações, segundo o conjunto de razões que dispõe o sujeito e até o ponto em que ele possa ampliá-las, e a necessidade de preservar a autonomia como finalidade que unifica o conjunto de ações autônomas dos agentes morais.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[autonomía moral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[razones morales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[moral y derecho]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[constructivismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Moral autonomy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[moral reasons]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[morality and law,constructivism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[autonomia moral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[razões morais]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[moral e direito]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="pt"><![CDATA[construtivismo]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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