Resumen

CHIODI, Alexsander Dugno  y  BERNARDI, Ana Julia Bonzanini. The Anti-democratic Threat as a Bargain Instrument in the Jair Bolsonaro Government (2019-2021). Rev. Urug. Cienc. Polít. [online]. 2023, vol.32, n.1, pp.129-150.  Epub 01-Jun-2023. ISSN 0797-9789.  https://doi.org/10.26851/rucp.32.1.6.

The Bolsonaro’s government has kept conflict and democracy as a constant element in public management, as in the relationship with branches of government. In the field of Rational Choice Theory, Schelling (1980) states that bargaining is part of dissuasion, taking place in the process of influencing the choices of the other player based on the generated expectations. Thus, the research question that guides this study is: Did the Bolsonaro government use the anti-democratic threat as a bargaining tool? In this sense, to identify the situations of bargaining, threat, and promise, we conducted a qualitative analysis, through the creation of the Bolsonaro Threat and Bargain Database, composed of 470 movements from 1.1.2019 to 9.9.2019. 2021. Preliminary conclusions indicate that Bolsonaro mobilized threat as a bargaining strategy, threatening democracy and stressing the relationship between powers throughout analyzed period.

Palabras clave : Rational Choice Theory; Threat; Bolsonaro; Democracy.

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