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Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política

Print version ISSN 0797-9789On-line version ISSN 1688-499X

Abstract

BONVECCHI, Alejandro  and  ZELAZNIK, Javier. Presidentialdecree power and legislative behavior in Argentina. Rev. Urug. Cienc. Polít. [online]. 2017, vol.26, n.1, pp.111-130. ISSN 0797-9789.

How do legislators respond to the use of legislative decrees by presidents? This article tests the theories of usurpation, delegation, and strategic convergence considering both the responses to decrees and their specific policy contents in Argentina. Argentinian legislators tacitly approve the overwhelming majority of decrees, even in policy areas where they would have incentives to modify or reject them. The study of one such area, tax policy, supports the theory of strategic convergence: the comparison of the contents of decrees and laws initiated by legislators indicates that presidents construct their decrees seeking to converge with congressional preferences over conflictive policy dimensions

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Keywords : Argentina; President; Congress; decrees.

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