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Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política

On-line version ISSN 1688-499X


CHASQUETTI, Daniel. The Success Secret: Presidents and Legislative Cartels in Uruguay (1995-2010). Rev. Urug. Cienc. Polít. [online]. 2011, vol.20, n.1, pp.9-31. ISSN 1688-499X.

In the last two decades the Uruguayan political system has shown a cooperative relationship between the two government branches. The Executives were able to pass their legislative agenda in an efficient way by building cartel-party at the Houses. This article proposes an explanation based on the theoretical developments of Cox and McCubbins (1993 and 2005), about the creation of legislative cartels in Uruguay. In particular, the article explains how constitutes a central authority in the House where the executive holds a dominant influence, and how that authority usurps and controls the agenda power. I also present new evidence about the legislator’s cooperation with the party aims, with the hope of getting benefits to extent their political careers. The data show that in the brief periods where the party or coalition does not work cartelized (rupture of the ruling coalition), the government's legislative agenda is severely affected

Keywords : parties; parliament; executive; legislators; Uruguay.

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